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Abstract
Background: The launch of Global Health Initiatives in early 2000′ coincided with the end of the war in Burundi.
The first large amount of funding the country received was ear-marked for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
and immunization programs. Thereafter, when at global level aid effectiveness increasingly gained attention,
coordination mechanisms started to be implemented at national level.
Methods: This in-depth case study provides a description of stakeholders at national level, operating in the health
sector from early 2000′ onwards, and an analysis of coordination mechanisms and stakeholders perception of these
mechanisms. The study was qualitative in nature, with data consisting of interviews conducted at national level in
2009, combined with document analysis over a 10 year-period.
Results: One main finding was that HIV epidemic awareness at global level shaped the very core of the governance in
Burundi, with the establishment of two separate HIV and health sectors. This led to complex, nay impossible, inter-
institutional relationships, hampering aid coordination.
The stakeholder analysis showed that the meanings given to ‘coordination’ differed from one stakeholder to another.
Coordination was strongly related to a centralization of power into the Ministry of Health’s hands, and all stakeholders
feared that they may experience a loss of power vis-à-vis others within the development field, in terms of access to
resources.
All actors agreed that the lack of coordination was partly related to the lack of leadership and vision on the part of the
Ministry of Health. That being said, the Ministry of Health itself also did not consider itself as a suitable coordinator.
Conclusions: During the post-conflict period in Burundi, the Ministry of Health was unable to take a central role in
coordination. It was caught between the increasing involvement of donors in the policy making process in a so-called
fragile state, the mistrust towards it from internal and external stakeholders, and the global pressure on Paris Declaration
implementation, and this fundamentally undermined coordination in the health sector.
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Introduction
The need for and complexity of aid coordination is well
recognized in the literature as well as in policy debates
[1–5]. Assessments of coordination since the late 1980s
have also shown that the commitment of all actors to
coordination principles and the principles’ adaptation to
the context are essential to their implementation [6–8].
However, while the commitment to coordination exists
the practice remains elusive for numerous reasons,
among them stakeholders' different agendas and devel-
opment visions [6–10] as well as limited capacity of re-
cipients to coordinate [8]. Dodd et al., in a study of
human resources for health and aid effectiveness agenda
in Lao discuss this as an ‘intent-practice gap’ in donors’
and government’s engagement with the coordination
agenda [11].
Among donor organizations there exists an inherent ten-
sion between accountability towards their home agencies
(eg high income countries' governments or related agencies)
and recipients’ priorities and agendas [12, 13]. Daniel Esser,
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for example, in a 2014 article on the tautological use of the
ownership concept, argues (quoting [14]) that “donors, […]
despite ‘proclaim [ing] in unison the importance of national
ownership of the development process by recipient coun-
tries’ ([14], p. 180), ultimately put their own accountabilities
first” ([15], pp. 48). One of his key arguments is that owner-
ship is a tool created and used by donors to retain their
power while shifting the responsibility for the lack of aid ef-
fectiveness to recipient’ governments.
For recipient countries, particularly in post-conflict
setting, the literature has identified a number of missing
‘inner’ attributes required for coordination: ownership,
but also institutional capacity, leadership, legitimacy,
trustworthiness [13, 16–22]. In many cases it is donors,
who have such negative perceptions of government cap-
acity and integrity, and believe that government is un-
willing or unable to coordinate, raising an inter-related
issue of legitimacy and trustworthiness [22]. An evalu-
ation of the applicability of the Paris Declaration on aid
effectiveness to post-conflict countries particularly
referred to the “weak institutional capacity” as a source
of lack of coordination and therefore of insufficient aid
effectiveness [23]. Furthermore, fragile and post-conflict
states often lack local champions and leadership due to
‘brain drain’, decreased quality of training, high turnover,
which all undermine good policy formulation and dir-
ectly affects coordination capacity [24].
Moreover, the sudden influx of donors in the
post-conflict period and their heterogeneity have been
reported to render the coordination process difficult [8].
Severino and Ray have even suggested that “in some
cases, the gains from having more actors involved are
outstripped by the losses that stem from policy incoher-
ence and coordination costs” ([25], pp.6].
Fragile and post-conflict states hence experience great
challenges in aid coordination, especially with the grow-
ing number and diversity of partners in international
aid, including the new Global Health Initiatives (GHIs).
However, to date, little attention has been paid to the
(internal and external) power relationships involved in
the coordination process and to the extent to which
these might influence coordination, while coordination
necessarily implies power.
This paper presents an in-depth study of the aid land-
scape in Burundi following the end of the civil war, offer-
ing a different, and far less studied perspective on the
discourses and practices of coordination. It considers
what happens within a country and government when
large sums of money begin to flow at the end of a civil
war, and multiple donors jostle for influence. More spe-
cifically, it describes these dynamics by providing a his-
torical and longitudinal analysis of aid coordination
from the immediate post-conflict period, in early 2000,
and the following decade.
Our analysis paints a complex picture of inter- and
intra-governmental politics and power struggles, that impact
on and are impacted by donor positions, leading to an active
and passive undermining of national and global policy intent
and practice, and subverting coordination from a functional
point of view. This paper extends research and analysis of
the role and impact of aid and aid coordination reaching
back to the 1990s when policy researchers started discussing
coordination as an essential instrument to improve aid ef-
fectiveness in the health sector [9, 26], and multiple mecha-
nisms were devised and assessed [6–8] [9, 15, 27]. Buse
emphasized the political and contested nature of aid and
co-ordination in 1999, arguing that, “although lip service is
paid to the over-used notion of ‘putting the recipient in the
driver’s seat’ a conspiracy of interests, suspicion, develop-
ment practices and inertia prevents this” (p 219). Seventeen
years later Esser (2014: 50) showed that “recipient country
preferences are [still] followed only to the extent to which
they do not conflict with donors’ priorities”.
Attention on aid coordination somehow decreased dur-
ing the global shift toward Millenium Development Goals
and the launch of GHIs. It returned to the agenda with
the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005, and the
increasing focus on health system strengthening. Indeed,
it became clear that health system effectiveness was
closely linked to aid coordination, as already pointed out
by some authors in the 1990s [4, 22]. Since a lack of co-
ordination was seen as related to the asymmetry of power
between donors and recipients (thus exacerbated in fragile
and post-conflict countries), the literature began to focus
increasingly on an analysis of recipient country capacity
(eg Brinkerhoff…..). A natural development of aid coord-
ination studies after the launch of Paris Declaration was
the analysis of the constituencies of the Paris Declaration:
leadership and ownership of recipient countries [28–32].
All these studies show a rather superficial ownership from
governments, and calls for an in-depth analysis of histor-
ical power (im)-balance at country level.
The paper seeks to extend these analyses and begins
by painting the historical and institutional landscape of
aid and aid coordination after 2001, before taking a
closer look at roles and positions of internal and external
organizations, as well as context and process-related fac-
tors influencing coordination. Its unique contribution
lies in the fine-grained analysis of the immense complex-
ity of relations between donors, between donors and
government institutions, and, very importantly, within
government itself, all of which further contributed to
paralysis, fracturedness, mistrust and inefficiency in an
immensely fragile post-conflict country.
Methods
The design of the study was qualitative in nature, retro-
spective, and used two different sources of information:
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semi-structured interviews with national and inter-
national role players (details of the interview schedule is
provided in a Additional file 1) and documents analysis.
Nineteen organizations, active in 2001, the year of ap-
proval of the first funding from GHIs, were selected ac-
cording to 2 criteria: exerting a direct or indirect
influence on health policies at any step of the health pol-
icy cycle and at national level; and providing a financial
contribution to the health system.
The following organizations were included in the study,
each organization constituting one unit of analysis, as well
as the whole set of organizations: the Ministry of Health
(MoH) central (named “central” by contrast to vertical
programs); vertical programs/unit within MoH (malaria,
tuberculosis, reproductive health, immunization programs
and HIV unit) as separate stakeholders from MoH central;
bilateral and multilateral donors (UK Department of Inter-
national Development – DfID-, Belgian technical cooper-
ation –BTC-, European Union –EU, World Bank); GHIs
such as Global Fund for AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM), Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunizations
(GAVI), GAVI-Health System Strengthening (GAVI-HSS);
Permanent Secretariat of National AIDS Council (PES--
NAC); Ministry of AIDS (MoA); United Nations for AIDS
(UNAIDS) and World Health Organization (WHO).
Interview participants were selected based on the rele-
vance of the position they held in their organization to
the topic of the study and/or further identified through
sequential reference/snowball sampling.
Data collection was conducted between February and
June 2009, as part of the WHO study “Maximizing posi-
tive synergies between GHIs and health systems”. The
main researcher collected data together with two re-
search assistants recruited locally and trained for the
purpose of the study.
Overall, 29 people were interviewed (Table 1). A stake-
holder perception and position analysis was conducted
in order to assess actor-related factors inhibiting coord-
ination. A framework analysis was used, according to the
following themes: knowledge of, interest in /position to-
wards and perceived barriers to coordination. This ana-
lysis was part of a wider analysis of aid coordination in
the health sector in Burundi, including process and con-
text analysis [33].
The language used for data collection was French. All
transcripts were translated in English, to enable
cross-comparison of themes with other researchers of
the team at the University of the Western Cape, School
of Public Health. Themes were presented to the 2 re-
search assistants in Burundi, to validate interpretation
consistency.
Quotes throughout the paper are identified by cat-
egory of participant and its origin (local or expatriate).
The origin of participant was important to distinguish,
since expatriates were more open in their viewpoints
and less prone to implicit meanings.
Material for document analysis were collected during
the interview process, or downloaded from partner’s in-
stitutions websites. They were also analysed using the
same framework analysis, and provided details on the
organizational history. They are listed in Table 2.
Findings
Historical context
The post-independence history of Burundi, after 1962,
has comprised 40 years of overt or latent armed and pol-
itical conflicts between different social groups, which
have their roots in the country’s colonial history. The
last civil war was triggered in 1993 by the assassination
of the first democratically elected Hutu President. In
2005, after a long peace negotiation process driven by
external actors in Arusha [34], a constitutional democ-
racy was established. Article 129 of the constitution im-
portantly legislated proportional representation of the 2
main ethnic groups in all governmental positions (60%
Hutus and 40% Tutsis), in order to facilitate inter-ethnic
reconciliation [35]. This reconciliation process is quite
specific to Burundi: externally driven peace negotiations
are quite frequent and impose a certain type of govern-
ance; but engraving ethnic quota is unique and must be
interpreted in the Great Lakes regional history of con-
tinuous power disputes and mass violence. While this
was an important step in an effort to heal the deep rifts
in Burundese society, it did not expunge the deep dis-
trust permeating the country and all its institutions. It
also immensely complicated the rebuilding of institu-
tions, as human resources capacity was extremely
Table 1 List of interview participants, by organisation




MoH central 4 2
MoH vertical programs 5
BTC 1
DfID 1







Other (local NGO) 1
GFATM 2
Total 22 7
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limited in the aftermath of the war, and now had to be
proportionally constituted. In 2010 and 2015, presiden-
tial election results were contested [36], and accusations
of corruption grew louder [37]. In 2018, the constitution
was changed, by removing some ethnic requirements
such as setting 2 vice-presidents from different
ethnicities.
The influx of aid, and the proliferation of actors and
interests in health have to be seen against this fragile na-
tional context, including the competition for resources.
The sudden inflow of post-conflict aid coincided with
the global launch of GHIs and the United Nations
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) declar-
ation on HIV, creating an extraordinary context for aid
in the health sector in Burundi.
A sign of its time: The HIV silo
As peace negotiations began in early 2000′, donors
began to position themselves and pour into the country.
This timing coincided with the UNGASS declaration in
2001 and related international pressure, which gave high
political visibility to HIV. In response to these global re-
quirements, and influenced by the World Bank, whose
discourse was to consider HIV not as a solely health
Table 2 List of documents consulted, according to the organization
Organization in charge of
document elaboration
Policy and planning documents consulted Corresponding evaluation documents consulted
(independent or not)
MoH central National Health Plan 2005–2015
National Health and Development Plan
2006–2010 and its attached financial plan
HRH pay-for-performance policy (2006)
Report on technical assistance for HRH management (2005)
HRH analysis from MoH-WHO (2008)
Evaluation of national health plan 2006–2010 (2011)
National TB and Leprosy
Program
National TB strategic plan 2007–2011 Annual activities reports on TB program 2007–2008
Health sector HIV unit National HIV unit plan 2008 National HIV unit activities report 2007
National Malaria Program § National Plan against Malaria 2008–2012 NA
National Reproductive Health
Program
National Reproductive Health Strategic
Plan 2008–2012
Annual reports on national reproductive health program 2005 to
2007 (no plan)
National Immunization
Program / IACC (GAVI)
GAVI /Immunization Program Multi-annual Plan
2002–2006
GAVI /Immunization Program Multi-annual
Plan 2007–2010
GAVI / Immunization Program Annual Plan 2007
Immunization plan /GAVI annual report 2006
BTC Indicative collaborative program 2003–2005
Technical and financial document for
Kirundo project
Institutional support project document
Analysis of BTC contribution to Burundi 1996–2002 (OAG)
DfID NA NA
European Union EU Cooperation Strategy and National
Indicative Program 2003–2007
LRRD ‘santé plus’ project document (EDF10)
EU-Burundi Joint annual report (2002)
Note on the situation in Burundi-UE (2007)
World Bank Second Health and population project (PSP2)*
MAP1 proposal
PSP2 report*
Final report on MAP1 implementation
MAP1 implementation completion and results report* (2009)
MoA No specific document available NA
PES-NAC National Strategic Plan against HIV 2002–2006*
National Strategic Plan against HIV 2007–2011
National Strategic Plan for HIV M&E 2007–2011
Annual activities reports of national strategic plan against HIV: 2003
to 2008
Mid-term review of the implementation of the national strategic
plan against HIV 2002–2006 (2005)
GFATM/CCM Funding proposals for:
GFATM-HIV (RIBUP, 2003–2006* and APRODIS,
2006–2010)
GFATM-malaria 2003–2006 and its RCC 2006–
2008
GFATM-TB 2005–2010
Grant performances reports GFATM-HIV*
GFATM-malaria*
GFATM-TB*
CCM retreat report 2008
Annual report on the RCC 2007–2008 (GFATM-malaria)
WHO WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2005–2009
WHO Health Sector Reform Strategy (2006)
NA
GAVI-HSS Proposal for GAVI-HSS support (2006) GAVI-HSS evaluation (2009)
UNAIDS 3 by 5 Initiative 2004–2005 NA
*All documents were written in French except for those marked, which were written in English
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issue but as a wider development issue, the government
of Burundi, and its major donors established HIV as a
stand-alone sector, separate from the health sector, in
the poverty reduction strategic paper. The scope of HIV
was considered to go beyond the scope of the MoH,
whose mission was to deal “only” with curative health is-
sues, via its « HIV unit ».
“….. The World Bank also realized that the HIV issue
was wider than simply a medical problem, but was
rather a multisectoral and behavioral issue, and that
such an issue could not be dealt by the MoH alone.
The MoH was at that time seen as very technical and
in particular not necessarily able to disseminate
prevention messages.” (donor representative 1,
expatriate).
Two major institutional reshufflings occurred subse-
quently. The first was the creation of a separate MoA in
2002, directly linked to the Presidency, encouraged by
local WHO and UNAIDS. This was meant to assure do-
nors that Burundi was taking into account the need to
tackle HIV in a cross-sectoral way. Secondly, the Na-
tional AIDS Council (NAC) and its Permanent Secretar-
iat (PES-NAC) were launched in 2002, after a joint
decision of the World Bank and UNAIDS, on the need
of a unique body of coordination for HIV. The Country
Coordination Mechanism (CCM) was soon nominated.
These were the first steps to enable application for
HIV-related funding, such as those proposed at global
level by the World Bank (Multisectoral AIDS Project 1 -
MAP1) and the GFATM. In fact, initial non-emergency
funding in the health sector in Burundi was mainly rep-
resented by GHIs, such as GFATM, the MAP1 of the
World Bank and GAVI.
As a result four main national-level institutions dealt
with HIV activities from 2003 onward: CCM, MoA, HIV
unit of the MoH and PES-NAC. These newly created in-
stitutions were tied together by complex relationships and
changing functions, sometimes competing against each
other thus inhibiting communication and coordination.
PES-NAC established very tight financial management
mechanisms since GFATM and MAP1 disbursements
were conditional on the approval of regular reports from
the recipients. Though MoH remained theoretically in
charge of implementing curative HIV activities, de facto
PES-NAC progressively became an implementing agency.
And when donors imposed some requirements upon
PES-NAC contracts, these were dismissed.
“Unfortunately, the government recruited people on
salaries we did not want. (…) The PES-NAC recruited
people for M&E and we required them to sign a con-
tract with the government (…). But it was difficult due
to issues specific [referring to ethnic quota] to Burundi”
(donor representative 1, expatriate).
This parallel financial management further contributed
to the MoH being sidelined, reflecting at least doubts
about the capability of the MoH to deal with such com-
plex and multisectoral issue as HIV. As a result, the
MoH resented the political importance given to the MoA
and the financial importance given to PES-NAC: the MoH
had no legitimate role to manage Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs), while PES-NAC relied on NGOs to
implement HIV activities. Besides, the MoA would say
“Health is not my issue, mine is development” (UN repre-
sentative, expatriate). A further complicating factor was
the fact that during the conflict, the landscape of health
sector funding was dominated by emergency and humani-
tarian aid. Aid for development, including for the health
sector, became available progressively after 2001, when
major battles calmed down. Service delivery during the
war was dominated by NGOs. In the early 2000s many of
these switched their focus to HIV, and proliferated. By
2008 over 500 NGOs were active in the country in
HIV-related activities [38, 39]. These were primarily ac-
countable to their donors and almost impossible to con-
trol or coordinate by government.
The donor landscape
Beside GHIs, a number of donors operated in
Burundi, some since its independence, and all with
different financing mechanisms, operating procedures,
interests, aims, objectives, visions and historical alli-
ances. Amongst major donors, the Belgian Technical
Cooperation (BTC) was the largest bilateral and the
oldest. It mainly operated via projects and technical
assistance. British DfID, having arrived in 2004, was
the newest, and supported coordination in the health
sector via technical assistance. The World Bank and
the EU had been active in Burundi since its
independence in 1962. The World Bank operated via
projects, and historically contributed to both HIV
(with its MAP 1 and 2 funding after 2001) and health
sectors (before 1993 –health population projects). The
EU also operated via projects and technical assistance.
The jostling for political influence through aid was
very tangible when analyzing the operational proced-
ure of funding agencies. There were several examples
in our findings to illustrate each actor’s particular in-
terests in securing Burundi as a privileged bilateral
partner. For example, during the conflict, the EU and the
World Bank continued to operate, presumably in order to
secure a return on investment in the post-conflict period.
Historical linkage and geo-political interests also influ-
enced eligibility to aid, such as for BTC, following a
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high-level decision to focus development aid in Central
African countries.
BTC and DfID, and to a much lesser extent WHO,
were the only donors directly supporting the MoH cen-
tral. WHO or UNAIDS funded vertical programs occa-
sionally, to cover financial gaps or in the case of
emergencies (such as epidemics) and WHO provided
technical assistance for policy development.
GFATM in Burundi cannot be considered a single
organization but rather as three different organizations,
corresponding to each of the three diseases to which it
contributed. While the three components had similar
principles, especially with regard to funding application
procedures and eligibility, management differed greatly
from one component to another. The difference was sig-
nificant with respect to the selection of the principal re-
cipient (PR) by the GFATM: while the National TB
Program became logically the PR for the GFATM-TB
grant, the PES-NAC was given the role of PR for
GFATM-HIV grant (together with the MAP1 and 2
grants) and, more surprisingly, also for GFATM-Malaria.
The complexity of institutional arrangements in gov-
ernment, together with a diverse donor landscape, gen-
erated an enormous web of financial channels and
relationships, which is presented in Fig. 1.
All these organizations had their own planning pro-
cesses, following grant applications periods, and the first
post-conflict plans for vertical programs started before
the national health plan was launched in 2005 (Fig. 2).
Under the influence of the Paris Declaration and the
Accra Agenda for Action, two coordination mechanisms
started to operate in Burundi, in addition to the
pre-existing CCM and MoH directorate of programs:
the National Committee for Aid Coordination (NCAC),
created in 2005 by the President of Burundi, under the
influence of major donors; and the International Health
Partnership Initiative (IHP+), from 2007, pushed by local
WHO.
National and international coordination mechanisms
A national level coordination mechanism: The framework
for consultation of health development partners
The NCAC supervised 13 sector groups, of which one
was for HIV and another for health, reproducing the dis-
tinction between HIV and health sectors created by the
poverty reduction strategic paper. In the health sector,
one major achievement was the establishment of a
framework for consultation of health development part-
ners (FCHDP) in March 2007, pushed by the Minister of
Health at that time and DfID.
Fig. 1 Synthesis of financial channels between the selected 19 organizations and some other key organizations (local NGOs, Ministry of Finance),
as of 2008 (own creation). Blue shapes: governmental organizations. Green shapes: donors’ organizations. Orange shapes: AIDS council organizations.
Bold arrows: financial flows over 1 million USD for 2007, with size of arrow being proportional to the amount.
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Following the creation of this framework, a Memoran-
dum of Understanding was signed in February 2008
[40]. The first signatories were EU, the World Bank,
DfID, Swiss cooperation, 4 NGOs, some UN agencies
and the MoH. Expected intermediate outcomes of this
Memorandum included an « improved efficiency of
international aid » via the commitment of financial and
technical partners and the MoH to “increased coordin-
ation and consultation” [40]. This framework also
introduced the creation of a permanent technical
multi-sectoral organ, in charge of piloting and monitor-
ing progress using Millennium Development Goals indi-
cators. Monthly meetings of the technical FCHDP were
co-headed by the Minister of Health and the lead donor
in the health sector. The first meeting of the technical
FCHDP was held in February 2009, but the regularity of
meetings seemed to depend on other external factors.
Some topics, suddenly prioritized, took over time and
resources available. For instance, between May and De-
cember 2009, no meeting was held, since Pay for Per-
formance (P4P) became the policy priority, led by a
managing unit created ad hoc at MoH central level ([41]
and donor representative 2, expatriate). Moreover,
FCHDP meetings were open to more than 50 individ-
uals, with the aim to be as inclusive as possible. While
the heterogeneity of actors could be an added value, the
absence of hierarchy and rules in terms of
decision-making did not favor coordination. Analysis of
meeting proceedings made the meeting look more like
an information sharing platform.
Fig. 2 Timeline of major institutional reshufflings, policy and planning documents and grants in the health sector between 2001 and 2010 (own
creation). Blue: national health plans and vertical programs’ plans. Orange: HIV-related plans. Green: GAVI and GAVI-HSS. Brown: GFATM non HIV.
Black: non earmarked aid organizations (EC, WB for PSP2, WHO and BTC)
Cailhol et al. Globalization and Health           (2019) 15:25 Page 7 of 14
IHP+ initiative: A global response to Paris declaration in the
health sector
The IHP+ (renamed UHC2030 since 2016) was a global
initiative launched in 2007 in order to catalyse coordin-
ation in the health sector and help achieve the MDGs.
The first step was a signature of a global compact, which
included main bilateral donors (but not USA) and GHIs
such as the World Bank and GFATM. The aim of IHP+
was to lead to the signature of a ‘compact’ between gov-
ernment and all development partners in the health sector
at national level [42]. Practical actions in order to better
coordinate activities in the health sector, linked to the IHP
+, included, in Burundi: an attempt to harmonise P4P ini-
tiatives which were unofficially and officially on-going all
around the country; the elaboration of the first national
health expenditures estimates for 2007 (finalised in 2009);
and the decision to mainstream HIV-earmarked funding
(part of MAP2) from the PES-NAC to the MoH central.
According to one IHP+ progress review conducted in
2009, sector dialogue remained very weak, however,
essentially conducted by donors. Disbursement of IHP+
funds to Burundi was very low (8% of US$800,000 over
the first two years) due to the heavy demands of admin-
istrative procedures and the lack of ownership by gov-
ernment [41]. The lack of skills and capacity to
coordinate was acknowledged both by the donors and
government [41, 43]. Government did not grasp the pur-
pose of IHP+ initially and managed IHP+ « catalytic
funding » as another « project ». Joint Monitoring
&Evaluation (M&E) missions of key donors started to be
organized annually from 2007, with uneven participa-
tion. The DfID, the EU and BTC were the lead donors in
joint M&E missions, but were not necessarily followed
by others, especially the GHIs, despite the fact that they
had signed the compact at global level. Eventually, DfID
withdrew its aid from Burundi in 2012. In contrast to
other GHIs, the World Bank shifted its attitude and got
involved in joint missions from 2011. The World Bank's
new policy was to not renew the MAP funding (which
meant cutting the budget for recurrent cost of
PES-NAC) and to focus on health system financing,
through the P4P mechanism. The FCHDP was supposed
to act as a vehicle for conveying coordination using IHP
+ as an overarching process, but instead, FCHDP used
IHP+ and its tools as another outcome-based project.
Proliferation of coordination mechanisms without
coordination
Beside IHP+ initiative and the FCHDP, other coordin-
ation mechanisms existed. Since its creation in 2000, the
MoH, the MoA, the MoH HIV unit and PES-NAC
members participated in CCM, making it the only for-
mal place where all of them eventually sat together regu-
larly to discuss HIV. On paper, one of the CCM’s roles
was to ensure linkages and consistency between GFATM
assistance and other development and health assistance
programs in support of national priorities, such as pov-
erty reduction strategies or sector-wide approaches [44].
However, in Burundi, CCM’s role (to which everyone ad-
hered) was limited to proposal development, around the
three diseases targeted by the GFATM. The CCM could
have been used as a space for coordinating HIV and
health sectors. It could also have acted as a steward for
mainstreaming part of HIV activities into the health sec-
tor. Instead it remained a simple fundraising instrument.
By contrast, Mozambique for instance managed to in-
clude GFATM and therefore the CCM in a sector-wide
mechanism, despite all the heavy reporting requirements
attached to GFATM and despite also being a
post-conflict country [45]. In Burundi, CCM was the
first so-called coordination mechanism in place and
given the two-headed nature of health and HIV sectors,
it proved unworkable. Other coordination mechanisms
were created around 2005, such as extended UNAIDS
working group and its coordinating group, but had short
survival periods.
There was also an attempt to merge MoH and MoA in
November 2007, and the MoA became a vice-Ministry
of AIDS within MoH. The MoA reversed back to a
stand-alone Ministry in January 2009, and was defini-
tively merged with MoH in July 2010.
Eventually, the Directorate for Programs and Health
Services (from MoH central) was, in theory and on
paper, in charge of coordinating vertical programs, in-
cluding HIV unit, malaria and tuberculosis programs. In
practice, the only role the Directorate played was to en-
sure that two programs did not clash physically during
their in-service training provision. Since vertical pro-
grams managed their own funding, or asked for dis-
bursement to PES-NAC (or to the Minister Cabinet,
which managed some funding directly), they by-passed
the Programs Directorate.
Stakeholder perceptions and practices of coordination
Coordination: A desirable goal with differing scopes
While all stakeholders interviewed retained the discourse
of co-ordination, perceptions and practices differed
sharply. All interviewees from MoH, but vertical pro-
grams, identified the FCHDP as one, if not the main,
tool for coordination.
Vertical programs did not seem to be convinced about
the usefulness of the new FCHDP initiative. Interviewees
perceived their participation in the FCHDP as unimport-
ant, since it was not attached to any incentive and co-
ordination was considered an inconvenience, costing
time and energy. Also, they felt that non-participation in
FCHDP did not have any consequence for program
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functioning, since programs were self-governed (by legal
statute or by custom).
The majority of respondents, except those from
GHIs-related organizations, argued that it was impos-
sible to coordinate with the MoA and PES-NAC since
the HIV budget was separate from the general health
budget.
“This funding (MAP1) was politically oriented. It had
a multisectoral dimension and gave a very limited role
to MoH. (…). Throughout almost all of MAP1, the
MoH was particularly absent. The MoA held the key
for funding (…). As much as USD36 million was made
available […] (NGO representative, local)”.
Vertical program managers understood coordination
as centralization of financial resources into the coordina-
tor’s hands and hence perceived coordination as a loss of
power, while local actors considered having a hand in
the financial management a sine qua non condition for
being able to coordinate. Vertical programs, which used
to self-manage their funding, were accountable to do-
nors regarding the use of funding. While they were will-
ing to coordinate, this was only within their program’s
scope, so as to keep a tight grip on funding.
“Program directors do not want to be integrated nor
coordinated; they want to keep their independence in
terms of management” (UN representative, expatriate).
In fact, no interviewees from vertical programs, struc-
turally part of the MoH, declared seeing any benefit in
being coordinated by one organ. Instead they expressed
the feeling that they should ‘self-coordinate’ as a
stand-alone program. No one was prepared to give up
on their own resources, let alone into the hands of a
general coordinator, in a country so poorly resourced.
A striking feature, however, was that even though vertical
programs did not want to be coordinated, they criticized
other organizations’ apparent opposition to coordination.
Overall, organizations blamed others for the lack of
coordination, especially competing institutions - for in-
stance the EU blamed non-EU member states.
The WB, one of the biggest funders since the inde-
pendence of Burundi, was perceived as the strongest op-
ponent to coordination by other actors and behaved as
such when MAP1 funding was implemented, by operat-
ing in a silo. While the World Bank changed its policy
and progressively shifted its focus to mainstreaming
their MAP2 funding into the P4P implementation, it
competed with the EU to impose its neoliberal ideology
(policy advisor, MoH, local). Other donors still contin-
ued to accuse the World Bank of performing bilateral
negotiations with the MoH and acting against
coordination, despite being part of the FCHDP. The
MoH actors defended however the World Bank clientel-
istic behavior against other donors:
“I think that it has been a misunderstanding. […] It is
true that the World Bank is proceeding more quickly
than others today. And I think to some extent that it is
also an opportunity to set up the tools and structures
which make it possible for all the donors to sit
together.” (policy maker 1, MoH, local).
The way some donors negotiate bilaterally with gov-
ernment, together with the “laissez-faire” of uncoordin-
ated management, might lie somewhere between a lack
of capacity to coordinate and passive clientelism. The
line is sometimes thin between these two notions, and
the distinction would relate to what values drive MoH
and its people, which are fundamental to understand
[46, 47].
Only two interviewees mentioned IHP+ initiative as a
coordination tool, and the signature of the compact at na-
tional level understood as a goal (and not as a process of
coordination).
In addition to coordination challenges at
inter-organizational level, donors and international ob-
servers considered the risk of a relapse of conflict in
Burundi as extremely high. Donors were therefore ex-
tremely cautious and were not prepared to finance
long-term plans. However short-term interventions
made co-ordination all the more difficult, further under-
mining the co-ordination endeavor.
Mistrust towards and within MoH
Stakeholders in general, whether local or international, in-
ternal or external to MoH, agreed on one point: they did
not trust the MoH capacity to lead or coordinate aid.
There were lots of references to the “lack of leadership” of
the MoH. Interviewees felt that for instance, despite their
willingness, the Minister (or alternatively the director gen-
eral for Health who represented the Minister), did not
have any power to insist that parties participate in FCHDP
meetings. Neither vertical programs nor GHIs representa-
tives participated and none of them saw an advantage or
incentive to be coordinated.
“It is up to the Minister [of Health] to lead everyone
and to call for the participation (…) to the FCHDP,
since he is the head of all health programs. It is not
the case today and all the [EU] partners and the EU
do not understand why”. (donor representative 3,
expatriate).
There was clearly mistrust with regard to funding
management, with the risk of mismanagement if funding
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was to be pooled and centralized mentioned specifically.
Parallel financial management systems were set in place
(such as PES-NAC), justified with a necessary swiftness
of reporting, but de facto in order to prevent any grant
mismanagement.
“I am not of the opinion to adopt a ‘common basket’
approach. (…) Just put the money with people you can
control! You cannot easily punish such important
personalities as ministers, but you can put any program
director into jail. The idea of using a ‘common basket’ at
the level of the general directorate for resources is
unreliable.” (vertical program manager, MoH, local).
Interviewees from MoH central and others felt the
Programs Directorate did not have any financial weight
and that this was the justification for being bypassed and
being unable to coordinate vertical programs.
MoH was not considered skilled enough also for tech-
nical reasons, all interrelated, amongst them the brain
drain during the civil war, lack of knowledge of the vo-
cabulary specific to funding, and time constraints at-
tached to funding application or policy reform.
Therefore, there was an ‘externalization’ of the policy
and funding proposal development processes, as illus-
trated by a generalized use of international consultants for
the elaboration of national plans and grants applications.
“Are we really aligned with national priorities? We
need first to look at how these national priorities were
elaborated, because in most weak capacity countries,
an international expert arrives with a document that
he copy-pastes and adapts a little. […] I discussed with
some experts from the WHO, who wrote certain plan-
ning documents. They did everything from A to Z.
When there is no capacity, someone needs to do the
job.” (donor representative 3, expatriate).
Discussion
Even though formal commitment was present, Burundi
internally faced multiple constraints inhibiting coordin-
ation, constituted by, inter alia: funding arrangements
and financial accountability channels imposed by do-
nors, ethnic quota, institutional reshuffling set at global
level and attached administrative burden. Coordination
mechanisms stood in direct competition with each other,
such as in the case of FCHDP and CCM, making them
“competitive and duplicative” [9] (Buse 1999: 224).
Where expedient, they were simply ignored, most not-
ably with the FCHDP, the reasons being, inter alia, a
high transaction cost of coordination, and the complex-
ities of processes. Most importantly, power imbalance
between stakeholders both internally and externally, due
to historical, political and financial context, fostered pre-
sumably clientelistic relationships, which subverted
coordination.
Accountability requirements in a post conflict period:
Conducive to giving birth to “monsters”
Burundi emerged from years of conflict at the same
time as the world’s aid focus shifted to HIV/AIDS.
International institutions, governments and NGOs
aligned their health agendas to gain access to the im-
mense resources available for HIV/AIDS program-
ming, framing what was funded, and how it was
funded. The UN agencies’ “Three Ones” principles,
agreed by donors and recipients of HIV-related fund-
ing shaped the very structure of government and gov-
ernance of the health sector in many countries [48,
49]. Burundi was no different, starting by the distinc-
tion of HIV and health sectors in the poverty reduc-
tion strategic paper (another donor-driven policy at
macro-level). In the health and development sector
NGOs proliferated and, most crucially, a whole paral-
lel system was set up to deal with HIV. The new
agendas served as a basis for the creation of MoA and
PES-NAC, and their attached parallel implementation
and M&E structures. Convergence between global
policies on AIDS exceptionality and the post-conflict
context in Burundi contributed to create structural
factors, which contributed to transform these organi-
zations into implementers and undermined coordin-
ation. As one interviewee said when talking about
PES-NAC: ‘we created a monster’ (donor representative 1,
expatriate). In theory, GFATM funding constituted an
innovation at its conception: the recipient was meant to
manage the grant. However, just like in other countries
[50], the way this funding was implemented in Burundi
proved to be the opposite.
In his paper on capacity development in fragile states,
Brinkerhoff emphasizes some aspects donors need to
take into account: the length of financing, which has to
be as long as possible; a pooled funding managed jointly
by donors and government; and a minimal burden of
grant management to prevent donors to by-pass govern-
ments [51]. Our analysis showed that none of these re-
quirements were respected in Burundi during the last
decade, especially when negotiating the poverty reduc-
tion paper and with regard to GHIs funding. Other au-
thors proposed new tools specific to post-conflict
countries, different from the traditional log-frames,
which are not adapted [52]. Instead, they argue for inte-
grated M&E tools which would be sensitive to culture,
people and relationships [52], that would avoid perpetu-
ating the same mistakes of implementing parallel struc-
tures and could also act on complex conflict roots.
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The vicious cycle of pervading mistrust, low capacity and
struggle for power
Those actors who had the greatest power were the
strongest opponents of coordination, since they per-
ceived coordination as having a detrimental impact on
their mandate and power. Lack of local capacity and
trust, particularly in the MoH, became a key argument.
Indeed, all actors who had a minimum of financial au-
tonomy (e.g. the Reproductive Health Program, the TB
Program and PES-NAC), argued that coordination
would imply a centralization of resources in the MoH
hands, with a subsequent decrease in their ability to
mobilize funding. By-passing the MoH was a normal
process during the war, and was perpetuated in its after-
math. This distrust towards the state further weakened
local governance, as noted by Uvin [46].
Another feature of the post-conflict period was the
increasing involvement of donors in the policy making
process. Indeed, donors not only participated in, but
dominated policy processes from A to Z – from issue
identification (in the national health forum) and prior-
ity setting (consultations between embassies, cooper-
ation heads and government), to policy elaboration
(grant and action plans elaboration support) and imple-
mentation (evaluation and monitoring by international
NGOs, by joint donor missions and other donor-driven
initiatives). Donors often took the lead in activities (as
implementers or as policy makers, or both), supposedly
to fill the vacuum left by a ‘weak MoH’. The govern-
ment found its supposedly central role of coordination
difficult to perform in the face of the proliferation of
donors, among whom there were also difficult interac-
tions and relationships. Donors interfered with all levels
of policy development, in an un-coordinated way, as is
commonly the case in settings where negotiation cap-
acities over aid are weak [53]. The control of the policy
agenda by donors has been well described in other
country case studies by Whitfield et al. [[53], chapter
12, ‘aid and power’]. While recipient countries behaved
differently from one another, in general donors’ influ-
ence in policy processes increased significantly from
the structural adjustments period. Some countries were
so deeply entangled with donors that in some case it
was not possible to even differentiate donors and recip-
ients (e.g. Mali, Tanzania, Ghana, Mozambique and
Zambia). Burundi was no different. In many instances,
government adopted policy initiated by specific donors.
In such a context of complex entanglement between
recipients and donors at every level of the
policy-making process, the declared commitment to
recipients’ ownership is called into question, despite be-
ing advocated in the Paris Declaration [15]. As
Goldberg and Bryant pointed at, ownership is based on
ideological values [30].
The MoH
The MoH, weakened and fragmented by post-conflict
complexities and depleted of resources, did not receive
from the donors and from its constituents the necessary
trust in order to lead all stakeholders on the path of
health sector rehabilitation. The rapidly « moving
agenda » at global policy level made it impossible to fos-
ter ownership at local level. Ownership, claimed by do-
nors as being so much missing in Burundi, might well
be another example of functional tautology as stated by
Esser, in order to justify shameless formulation and im-
plementation of donor-driven policy [15]. There was a
general agreement in our analysis that the lack of coord-
ination was partly related to the lack of leadership and
vision on the part of the MoH, which did not even con-
sider itself a suitable coordinator. Walt et al. noted in
other contexts that the MoH cannot be regarded as one
sole actor, given the internal divisions following individ-
uals’ affiliation to units or their own interests [8]. In our
case study of Burundi, the same applied to the MoH’s
‘central’ and to its ‘vertical programs’ whose dedicated
funding undermined any interest in coordination. This
suggests that coordination should be understood as a
process that needs to take place not only across donors
and other country-level recipients, but also within the
MoH.
In fragile states, the MoH needs to be strengthened in
asserting his authority and legitimacy in order to coord-
inate [19], but donors, instead, contributed to over-
whelm it in Burundi, by unremitting demands. The
MoH should be put at the heart of the health system re-
construction process, and not just be a subordinate for
externally-decided policies tailored on globally available
funding [19].
In Afghanistan, another post-conflict state, NGOs
were held accountable to MoH, and a grants and con-
tracts management unit was created, in the MoH, with
local people, in order to increase its quality, credibility,
in a virtuous circle [31]. Authors showed that with this
approach to put the MoH in the driver’s seat, the health
system recovered quickly, although there was no men-
tion of the prevailing relationship between donors and
MoH [31]. Eventually, the question of lack of trust-
worthiness of MoH should be investigated further, in
light of the post-conflict context, in order to assess its
roots. The weak institutional capacity claimed by donors
and even by MoH actors probably encompasses this
issue of trustworthiness, and there is a need for a deeper
understanding of how capacity is defined, built and lost
at institutional level.
Last but not least, Lund and Uvin insisted on the ne-
cessary shift from clientelism to citizenship in particular
in Burundi and change the nature of aid, which is still
political in fragile states [17]. Brown et al. showed in
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their analysis that the World Bank might well play rhet-
oric at global level (in their pledge to the stalled Health
Systems Platform), and this could reflect at country
level, particularly in clientelistic approach, but it might
also not be the only donor acting as such [54].
Conclusion
Once again, partners’ organizations put their accountabil-
ity towards their funders first, instead of putting it towards
the MoH and Burundi’s citizens. Adding a sector specific
to HIV was the primary mistake, increasing the already
complex accountability parallel channels. This resulted in
a multiplication of administratively burdensome institu-
tions, chaotic planning and grant applications process,
followed by a race for implementation, in which the MoH
was sidelined. Ethnic interpersonal issues seemed to have
complicated coordination at high level (Ministers). Coord-
ination mechanisms, externally-driven, were not fully
grasped, or were sidelined by higher interests.
When tracking the progresses made by Burundi in the
IHP+ evaluation report, we see that the compact was
eventually signed in December 2012, for the period
2012–2015. The three major contributors to health sec-
tor at that time– the BTC, EU and the World Bank -
were signatories, as were four UN agencies and three
civil society organizations, beside the MoH and the Min-
istry of Finance. However, as of 2017, it is worrying that
USAID was still not signatory, while its contribution to
Official Development Aid (ODA) in Burundi increased
more than 12-fold between 2007 and 2016. During the
same period, other donors such as France, UK or EU,
decreased their ODA by 2- to 4- fold [55], the same pro-
portion applying to the health sector [56]. The CCM
continues to operate in Burundi as of 2017, mainly man-
aging GFATM-HIV and PEPFAR funding.
The signature of the compact, constituted as a goal for
IHP+, might not have succeeded in overcoming the div-
ide between HIV and health sectors, still vivid. More-
over, the compact became a vehicle of the imposition by
donors of another global-driven policy, the results-based
management in the health sector, mainly illustrated by
P4P [57, 58]. Despite numerous high-profile commit-
ments, mostly notably the Paris Declaration, and the es-
tablishment of many co-ordination mechanisms these
assessments remain fundamentally valid; that aid and aid
coordination essentially remained a tool of local and
international politics. The whole architecture of aid
needs to be transformed, in order to get rid of the possi-
bility of clientelistic relationships running against coord-
ination, and perpetuated by the current nature of aid.
Future research and policy directions in post-conflict
countries' aid coordination should focus on two levels:
an initial assessment of MoH capacity to coordinate aid
towards an effective health system reconstruction, and
of the potential for clientelistic relationships, which will
be counter-productive to coordination efforts; together
with an understanding of the roots of the conflict, which
could influence the capacity of MoH to work with
people, inside or outside MoH.
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